In 2009, the US government spent more than $42 billion on the federal-aid highway program. Most of this money was raised from motor vehicle taxes, whose proceeds are deposited in the highway trust fund. Federal motor vehicle user taxes flow into the fund and aid expenditures flow out from it to build and maintain highways and other transportation infrastructure. With so much money at stake it should be no surprise that expenditure decisions are the subject of intense political debate. Chief among these debates is the conflict between donor states, whose residents pay more in highway user taxes than the state receives in federal highway aid and donee states, whose residents pay less in highway user taxes than the state receives in highway aid. While this geographic redistribution has been masked recently by infusions of general fund revenue into the trust fund, the debate nevertheless continues. This paper attempts to understand why some states are donors and others are donees by simultaneously testing four hypotheses about the geographic redistribution of federal highway dollars that relate to a state's highway need, economic condition, level of urbanization, and representation on the key Congressional oversight committees. The analyses show that redistribution does not favor states with larger highway systems, more highway use, or lower median incomes, all of which are different indicators of need. Instead, states that are less urban and better represented on the four key Congressional committees generally benefit from redistribution. These findings indicate that the user tax revenues are not used in places where they are most needed. Thus they provide little empirical support for any compelling policy argument for continued geographic redistribution of federal highway user tax dollars.
Introduction
The US federal highway program is primarily funded by highway user taxes whose proceeds are deposited in a dedicated trust fund, called the highway trust fund. Federal highway aid expenditures then flow from the fund to build and maintain highway and other transportation projects around the country. However, there is no guarantee that money is returned to the state from whose taxpayers it is collected. The highway program creates winners and losers. Some states pay more in highway user taxes than they receive in federal highway aid; these states are called donor states. Other states receive more in aid than they pay in user taxes; these states are called donee states. Donor state representatives have long pressed for a more equitable distribution of federal highway dollars, usually citing general fairness concerns. As then-Ohio Senator Howard Metzenbaum stated in 1991:
"What we have here is a debate about numbers. It has to do with the fact that a number of States have been shortchanged over a period of years, and there may very well have been a reason for that to have occurred, because some of the Western States did not have as much tax revenue, had longer highways, so that kind of arrangement was made… (but today) the basic issue has to do with the fairness and equity of some States getting 85 cents on the dollar and some

States getting $2 and $3 and $7 on the dollar paid in." (Congressional Record
1991: 7401)
Representatives from donor states have long complained about the perceived unfairness of their treatment. Their complaints helped delay passage of the two most recent pieces of federal surface transportation authorizing legislation until compromises could be negotiated among the various states' Congressional representatives. They wanted a larger proportion of their residents' user tax payments returned to them in highway aid. They have typically used Thus, geographic redistribution of user tax money is still a fact in the federal highway program, despite the ongoing infusion of non-user tax revenues into the fund.
The donor state controversy raises one important policy question: why are some states donors and other states donees? Related to this is the question: does geographic redistribution serve any compelling public policy rationale? And finally: if geographic redistribution does not serve any compelling public policy rationale, why does it continue?
There are a number of potential explanations for the geographic redistribution of federal highway user tax revenues. Historically, redistribution was necessary to build a national highway network, most notably the interstate highway system. However, the interstate highway system was completed about 20 years ago, while geographic redistribution continues. Other alternate explanations for redistribution range from attempts to address different states' varying highway needs, defined in a number of different ways, to political considerations that often fall under the label of pork barrel politics, to what might be called simple programmatic or institutional inertia.
For example, geographic redistribution might serve as a means of aiding states with more extensive highway systems or more highway system use, both measures of highway need. Or, redistribution might benefit lower income states and/or states that do not have the state fiscal resources they need to maintain their highway systems. Each of these explanations could be categorized as equity-based policy arguments for geographic redistribution. Alternately, geographic redistribution might benefit states that have had representation on the key congressional committees that write the nation's transportation legislation. This explanation would fit in with political science theories about pork barrel and redistributive politics. Finally, redistribution may simply be the result of legislative inertia, a product of the highway program's earlier history as a predominantly rural-oriented highway program. Perhaps rural states are the beneficiaries of redistribution by virtue of their overrepresentation in the Senate and the legislative structure's tendency toward policy inertia? This paper tests these various potential explanations for geographic redistribution in order to understand the logic and/or consequences of redistribution. The analysis shows that, at different periods over the last three decades, variables associated with all of these hypotheses were related to a state's user tax-derived aid apportionment, its net aid distribution, and its ratio of user tax-derived aid apportionments to user tax payments. The last two variables serve as measures of geographic redistribution, which is the primary focus of our study. Both measures were negatively associated with indicators of highway need, positively related to a state's income, negatively associated with its degree of urbanization, and, generally positively associated with its representation on the Congressional committees that oversee the highway program. These findings provide little empirical support for any compelling policy argument for continued geographic redistribution of federal highway user tax dollars.
Donors versus donees and federal highway aid apportionment
The program at the center of the donor state debate is the federal highway program, which is one of a handful of programs financed primarily by highway user taxes (Federal Highway Administration 1999). The proceeds from federal taxes on fuel, tires, oil, and other items used by the traveling public are deposited into the federal highway trust fund. The revenues deposited in this fund are then distributed among the states in the form of financial assistance for highway, transit, and other transportation projects. Historically, highway user taxes have provided the bulk of the money used to support the highway program, which is funded from the highway trust fund's highway account. But in recent years the highway trust fund has been bolstered by the infusion of some general fund revenues derived from other tax sources. In 2009, user tax sources provided $27 billion in revenues to the federal highway trust fund's highway account, which funds federal aid highway projects, while an additional $7 billion in general fund revenues were transferred into the account (Federal Highway Administration 2011, The primary reason for this funding deficit is Congressional reluctance to increase federal highway user taxes for almost 20 years, which has weakened the highway trust fund's purchasing power in the face of general price inflation and increased motor vehicle fuel efficiency. But even with these recent general fund transfers, the bulk of federal highway revenues still come from motor vehicle user taxes, which is in keeping with the rationale for having a highway trust fund in the first place-as a repository of funding for a user tax-based highway finance system (Brown 1998; Federal Highway Administration 2011, Table FA-5) .
Indeed, highway user taxes have long been characterized as being the functional equivalent to fees levied on travelers for using the highway system (Bramlett 1982). The user-fee view of highway user taxes was an important argument used by proponents for a creating a federal highway trust fund in 1956 and it is a critical part of the donor state debate today (Brown 1998; Utt 2011). One logical interpretation of the user fee view of motor vehicle taxes is that the proceeds of the taxes should be used to fund projects that benefit the individuals who pay the tax, the users of the transportation system. This has indeed been the historic position of most key stakeholder groups involved in federal highway policy debates (Brown 1998). A second, related, interpretation is that, barring any compelling policy rationale, the money raised from taxpayers should be used to build and maintain facilities in the places where the revenues are raised, to the maximum extent possible. In this view, user tax revenues would therefore not be redistributed at all, or perhaps redistributed only in furtherance of an explicit compelling national policy goal, such as the creation of the national interstate highway system. This latter interpretation is generally reflective of the donor state view of the issue.
Of course, while user tax revenues have historically largely been reserved to fund transportation projects, save for a short time when some trust fund revenues were diverted toward deficit reduction in the 1990s, revenues have been geographically redistributed over the entire history of the federal highway trust fund. This is the crux of the donor-donee debate, with so-called donor states receiving less in aid than they contribute in user tax revenues and donee states receiving more in aid than they contribute in taxes. Each era reflects different compromises around the donor state issue, as we will note shortly.
The panels show that states with the highest annual per capita aid apportionments include the upper plains states, West Virginia, Vermont, Alaska, and Hawaii. The spatial pattern has changed slightly over time. Thus, the desire for geographic equity among the states is a strong feature of the highway program.
Political negotiations over minimum guaranteed returns
Donor state representatives grudgingly accepted the need for geographic redistribution while the basic national highway infrastructure, especially the interstate system, was put in When TEA-21 was passed in 1998, it contained a slightly higher minimum guaranteed return provision (90.5 percent), which affected all highway program categories (TEA-21 1998). Many apportionment formulas were also changed to include factors more closely related to population, highway mileage, and highway use, on the grounds that they were better indicators of a state's general highway need (Federal Highway Administration 1999a; Federal Highway Administration 1999b). These developments raised the possibility of significant changes in the return ratios of the various states. However, TEA-21 also contained a "hold harmless" provision that protected states from a dramatic decline in their apportionments from the ISTEA levels (TEA-21 1998).
Between 1998 and 2005, geographic redistribution continued, although not to the same degree as in the past, and so did donor state complaints (see column 4 of Table 1 There are a number of ways to measure the donor state phenomenon, but the most basic measure is perhaps what is called the return ratio. The return ratio is the ratio of federal aid apportionments taken from the highway account of the federal highway trust fund to user tax payments paid into the highway trust fund. This ratio is the subject of the equity bonus provisions in recent federal transportation legislation that is designed to address the donor state issue. The money difference between aid apportionments and tax payments can be thought of as the state's net return. Donor states receive a negative net return and donee states receive a positive net return. Table 1 In this paper, we test four specific hypotheses that relate to policy-based and functional explanations for redistribution. We test whether a state's donor or donee status is related to its highway system need, its general economic status, its level of urbanization, and its political representation on the Congressional committees that oversee the highway program. The first two hypotheses correspond to policy-based rationales for geographic redistribution while the last two hypotheses correspond to more functional explanations. We discuss these hypotheses in more detail below.
Highway system need
One explanation for geographic redistribution is that it is an attempt to assist states with greater highway needs. If true, states with larger highway systems and/or more motor vehicle travel per capita should receive more federal highway aid per capita and also be beneficiaries of redistribution. We sought to explicitly test these propositions. We define highway system need on the basis of two measures: 1) highway system extent and 2) highway system usage. We define highway system extent using total highway lane miles by state for each year. We define system usage as the Vehicle Miles Traveled (VMT) per capita in each year. We found that this measure produced stronger model results than several alternatives, including VMT per highway lane mile and VMT per licensed driver.
Aid poorer states
Another explanation for geographic redistribution is to assist poorer states. If true, poorer states should receive more federal highway aid per capita and also be beneficiaries of redistribution. We define a state's wealth using a relative measure, per capita income (in 2005 dollars). A more ideal measure, used in the study by Lem (1996) would be state fiscal capacity, but this measure is not available for the entire study period included here.
Rural bias and programmatic inertia
A third for geographic redistribution is that a pro-rural state bias exists and that more urbanized states are losers in the donor-donee contest. If true, states that are less urban (more rural) should receive more federal highway aid per capita and also be beneficiaries of redistribution. The federal highway program began as a rural program, so an anti-urban or prorural bias might merely be a reflection of programmatic history that has remained in place due to legislative inertia and/or the disproportionate representation that less urban and/or lower population states have in the US Senate. We define the degree of urbanization in a state using the percent rural population. (by state) on each committee for each year. Four "chair" variables are also collected to designate the state which the chair of each committee represents in every year. We further hypothesize that the seniority of a state's representatives on these committees is another good indicator of political influence, based on discussion in the political science literature. In the model, we include one seniority variable for each of the two authorization committees-terms of service (House)/ranking (Senate). In cases where multiple committee members from the same state were present, we only include the most senior member's attributes. Terms of service (House) variable is categorized by the sum of consecutive and non-consecutive terms of service, with the greater number of term of service assumed to provide higher weight in the decision making arena. 2 Senate ranking is based on the beginning date of present service, where a higher ranking is assigned to a senator the longer he/she has been in office continuously. 3 We obtain seniority data from the Congressional Directory. 2 Also, while consecutive terms of service are generally considered to be of higher status than non-consecutive terms of service, this was not taken into account in this paper. For example, a representative with 13 terms non-consecutive terms of service is considered to influence outcomes with the same impact as a representative with 13 terms consecutive. Both of the representatives with 13 terms of service are considered more influential in the decision making process than those representatives with 12 or fewer terms of service (regardless of whether their 12 or fewer terms were consecutive or not).
Political representation and the pork barrel hypothesis
All membership variables related to the authorization committees are measured at a base year, which reflects the year in which the reauthorizing decisions and formulae were made for each reauthorization period. For this reason, the base-year authorization committee member We use two different model specifications in our analyses: fixed effect clustered data model and random effect clustered data model. These two model specifications use different assumptions and methods in addressing the time-varying effect across our clusters (i.e. year).
We include both of them in our analyses to test whether our findings are subject to changes in the model specification. In addition, Hausman (model specification) tests are conducted to determine which model specification is a better fit for our data. The detailed model specifications are shown as below.
1) Fixed Effect Clustered Data Model
t represents year, which is the cluster in the model. i represents state. X ti, is a k×1 vector of independent variables (including highway need, economic condition, degree of urbanization, and political representation), ! ' is a 1×k vector of parameters (including intercept). ! t is a scalar constant representing the effects of unobserved time-varying variables that are peculiar 5 In 2008, the highway account of the Highway Trust Fund received 8.017 billion dollars from the general fund (Table  FE- 
Empirical results
A snapshot of the past three decades
We first apply these two model specifications to test our four hypotheses using data that cover the entire period of 1974-2008. As shown in Table 2 , the fixed effect models and random effect models have similar coefficient estimates. Models (1) and (2) in Table 2 ( Table 2) Models (3) and (4) in Table 2 presents the results for fixed effect and random effect models that examine the relationship between net return per capita and variables representing our four hypotheses. The results are similar to Models (1) and (2): states with fewer highway lane miles received higher net return per capital; richer states and more rural states received higher net return; states with more representatives on the Senate EPW committee and the Senate SAAP committee received higher net return; states for which the chair of SAPP committee and the chair of EPW committee represent always received substantially higher net return; in addition, seniority (measured in terms of service) of the CTI committee members also increased the net return for the states they represent. A notable difference in the net return models is that states with more highway usage (measured in VMT per capita) received less net return per capita, although previous models (1) and (2) show that these states received larger apportionment per capita. This is reasonable because states with more intense highway usage paid more into the Trust Fund and also received more from the Fund, but they still experienced a net loss.
Models (5) and (6) in Table 2 presents the results for fixed effect and random effect models that examine the relationship between return ration and our explanatory variables. The results are very similar to the net return models (3) Note that Models (1) (3) (5) use fixed effect model specification and Models (2) (4) (6) use random effect model specification. As we discussed in the model specification section, the major difference between fixed effect model and random effect model is that they use different assumptions and methods in addressing the time-varying effect across our clusters (i.e. year).
Therefore, we include both specifications in our analyses. A quick comparison of the coefficient estimates between fixed effect models and random effect models show that the differences are only marginal, both statistically and economically. However, Hausman (model specification)
tests suggest that random effect model specification fit our data better than the fixed effect. In the following session where we compare differences across the five legislation reauthorization periods, we only discuss results based on the random effect models. In addition, we also conduct Likelihood-ratio test to see whether heteroskedasticity exists across clusters. The test finds no heteroskedasticity across clusters (i.e. years).
Comparing five legislation reauthorization periods
Since the authorizing legislation experienced four changes over the entire period of 1974-2008, we are very interested in testing whether our previous findings for the entire time period also hold true for each of the five legislation reauthorization periods. In other words, we are interested in understanding whether the various donor-donee compromises enacted over the years have affected these general patterns in significant ways. We thus stratify our data into five Table 4 presents the random effect model results for net return per capita, the first of our two measures of redistribution. Across all five periods, highway lane miles were always significantly and negatively related to the per capita net return, implying that states with more developed highway systems are less likely to be donees. Results for VMT per capita were statistically significant for the 1983-1991 and 1992-1998 periods, with a negative relationship to the per capita net return. This suggests that states with more intense highway usage are more likely to be donors. In all five periods, per capita income and percent rural population consistently and positively affected per capita net return, suggesting that states that have higher per capita income and more rural population are more likely to be donees. (Table 4) Results for political representation in this series of models show more consistent results than in Table 3 . Number of representatives on the EPW Committee was a very consistent and strong factor for states to get a larger net return in each period. Number of representatives on the SAPP Committee also had a consistently positive impact on net return in all periods. Chairs of the CTI Committee, EPW Committee, and SAPP Committee generally were able to help their representing states to get a larger net return in different periods (whenever the estimates were statistically significant). Seniority variables (ranking and terms of service) show weak and mixed impact on net return across the five different periods. In general, our analysis suggests that political representation, particularly in the Senate, have made states better off in getting a larger net return per capita.
3) Return Ratio Table 5 presents the random effect model results for return ratio, our second measure of redistribution. Across the five periods, highway lane miles and Vehicle Miles Traveled per capita were once again consistently and significantly affecting the return ratio. States with more developed highway systems and more intense highway usage had a substantially lower return ratio in almost all five periods, and thus were less likely to be donees. In addition, per capita income and percent rural population have shown consistent and strong positive impact on return ratio, implying that states with higher per capita income and more rural population have been able to get a substantially higher return ratio in almost all five periods.
( Table 5) Results for political representation in this series of models are similar to those in Table 4 .
Number of representatives on Senate EPW Committee was a significant factor for states to get a substantially higher return ratio in 1974-1982, 1992-1998, and 2005-2008 . The number of representatives on the SAPP Committees also showed consistent and positive impact in four periods. Chairs of the four Committees had weak impact, but in general they were able to help their representing states to get a larger return ratio in different periods (whenever the estimates were statistically significant). And seniority variables (ranking and terms of service) once again showed weak and mixed impact. In summary, states with better political representation, particularly in the Senate, have generally fared better in getting a higher return ratio per capita.
Discussion and conclusion
The model results for apportionment per capita reflect legislative expenditure decisions, without considering revenues raised, while those for net return per capita and return ratio directly relate to the issue of geographic redistribution of federal aid dollars. The first set of models shows that aid apportionments have been positively related to a state's highway usage, per capita income and percent rural population, but negatively related to highway extent.
Political representation show mixed results, but in general, states with better representation in the four committees, particularly in the Senate, were able to receive larger apportionment on a per capita basis. Note that although states with more intense highway usage were able to receive more apportionments than other states, their net return and return ratio were still substantially lower in most legislation reauthorization periods, as discussed next.
The other two sets of models are directly related to the issue of geographical redistribution, Congress is in the midst of ongoing debates about the future of the federal highway and other surface transportation programs. These debates occur against a backdrop of declining revenues, particularly from highway user taxes, escalating highway needs, and a lack of public and/or political sentiment to increase tax rates. Given these circumstances, it is essential that the user tax revenues be used in the places where they are most needed. This study would appear to indicate that this is not presently the case, at least when need is defined on the basis of the extent and/or use of a state's highway system. More careful reflection on the logic, purpose, and results of geographic redistribution would appear to be in order. This single study can't provide all the answers, but perhaps it could help provide some structure to the policy conversation about these critical issues. 3) HAPP committee refers to the House Appropriations Committee. 4) SAPP committee refers to the Senate Appropriations Committee. 5) District of Columbia is excluded in the analysis because it has 0 percent rural population. Also, it has no representative in the Senate and only a non-voting member in the House.
Return Ratio Net Return Per Capita Approtionment Per Capita 3) HAPP committee refers to the House Appropriations Committee. 4) SAPP committee refers to the Senate Appropriations Committee. 5) District of Columbia is excluded in the analysis because it has 0 percent rural population. Also, it has no representative in the Senate and only a non-voting member in the House. 3) HAPP committee refers to the House Appropriations Committee. 4) SAPP committee refers to the Senate Appropriations Committee. 5) District of Columbia is excluded in the analysis because it has 0 percent rural population. Also, it has no representative in the Senate and only a non-voting member in the House. 
